Jewish Forum for Justice and Human Rights

October 2nd 2007
Report by Lawrence Joffe

Perceptions might not be everything, but they certainly count for a lot.
So it would seem judging from a fascinating discussion hosted by JFJHR
concerning the vexed question of rising tensions between Israel and Iran.
 
Chaired by Sir Geoffrey Bindman, visiting professor of law at University
College London, the discussion began with illuminating presentations by
three well-placed experts, before being opened up to the floor. The
first speaker was Peter David, foreign editor of /The Economist/. Next
came Prof. Naomi Chazan, former Israeli Knesset member, peace campaigner
and academic. The last to speak was Prof. Anoush Ehteshami, professor of
international relations at Durham University.
 
*Peter David*, who wrote an acclaimed report on Iran in July following a
long visit to that country, began by setting current worries in the
context of a ìbigger pictureî. Certainly, he argued, 2008 would spell a
dangerous phase with the confluence of two phenomena ñ technical
progress towards Iranís likely building of nuclear weapons, and the
timetable for elections in the USA.
 
After analysing the psychological and domestic political hinterland
behind Israeli fears, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejadís more
incendiary threats, David concluded by listing five likely future
scenarios. Of the five options, David suggested that the most likely was
a ìgrand bargainî between the USA and Iran based on ìcommon interestsî.
Such a bargain might defuse the current tensions. But before it could
work, more groundwork was needed to create the right conditions. And
there was still the risk that things could go seriously wrong.
 
As if to illustrate the high stakes at play, David noted that Iran could
build a bomb within eight years at most, said the IAEA. Even Iranís
traditional backers, Russia and China, insisted that the UN should stop
Iranís process back in July 2006, but to no avail.
 
Iran had also ìclimbed up George Bushís list of scapegoats as things got
worse in Iraqî. Bush has often described Iran as ìevilî; his stated
creed is to deny ìthe worst weapons to the worst regimesî. So what is to
prevent him from ending his term ìwith a bangî by launching a
pre-emptive strike, asked David?
 
In answer to his own question, David listed some sensible barriers to
rash action. These included doubts about where Iranís facilities lie,
and the realisation that Iran could rebuild its project with easily
accessible fissile fuel. There were also political fears: might not an
attack merely galvanise ordinary Iranians around what is an increasingly
unpopular regime? And perhaps Iranian retaliation could be more
dangerous than a US attack. Conceivably they could close down the
Straits of Hormuz, bolster terrorism, or turn the US army in Iraq into
ìour hostageî.
 
If rationality might preclude perilous action by the USA, surely the
same analysis does not apply with Tehran. Yet, here, too, David
suggested that things were not all they seemed. To be sure, ever since
Ahmadinejad took power in 2005, anti-Israel rhetoric has mounted
alarmingly. Expressions like ìremoving Israel from the pages of historyî
hardly inspire confidence.
 
That said, argued David, these belligerent views are not new. Ever since
1979, Ayatollah Khomeini denied the right for a Jewish state to exist in
the region. Official Iranian ideology remains unchanged; only the overt
nature of threats is a new feature.
 
So why might that be? Maybe, suggested David, Ahmadinejad and his clique
were trying to ìrekindle a revolution that was beginning to run out of
steamî. Radicals tend to evoke ìpermanent revolutionî and spout slogans
that donít require ìdeliveryî. Perhaps we are seeing an attempt to
divert attention from unfulfilled revolutionary promises, combined with
an ìopportunistic commitment to liberating Palestineî and a desire to
break the bonds of perceived Iranian isolation.
 
Of course, this still does not tell us how powerful the hardliners
really are. Nor does it suggest how fierce words might lead, even
unwittingly, to irreversible and disastrous actions. For that, the
audience had to await Prof. Ehteshamiís more detailed insights into the
labyrinthine workings of the Iranian system.
 
David acknowledged Israelís ìgenuine fearsî, but discounted the idea
that Israel would strike first. Even if Iran /did/ acquire nuclear
bombs, said David, that would not necessarily be catastrophic. ìThe
regime is not suicidal, despite its links with suicide bombersî, he noted.
 
Finally, what about that ìgrand bargainî, a solution that today seems
fantastical? Well, explained David, Iran and the USA both want a united,
Shia-led Iraq; they both want to prevent the Taliban from retaking
Afghanistan; and for economic reasons, both want to protect the Persian
Gulf. With such shared interests, he concluded, a saving compromise
might ñ just ñ be feasible.
 
To *Naomi Chazan* there was no doubt about whether Israelis see Iran as
a threat. ìOn this question there is a very loud affirmative, a broad
consensusî. However, closer inspection revealed differences of emphasis
that could lead to wildly differing courses of action.
 
ìOn the one handî, she said, ìit seems like we are on a collision
course. On the other, direct confrontation is not inevitableî. Admitting
that she would be concentrating solely on Israeli perspectives ñ a bit
like the old joke, ìThe elephant and the Jewish questionî ñ Chazan
described a threefold threat. First, an ideological desire to threaten
Israelís very existence; second, Iranís role in financing terror groups
and hostile regimes; and third, a specific nuclear strike whose first
target would be Israel (and because of geographical proximity,
paradoxically, Palestine).
 
Nonetheless, conceptions of the Iranian threatís seriousness and urgency
depended on what Chazan dubbed ìfour and a half optionsî. First came the
ìalarmistsî who worry about everything concerning Iran, and see it as
Israelís greatest enemy. This school includes Likud, rightwing
think-tanks and some of the Israeli military. The second category,
representing the official government line of Kadima and mainstream
Labour, emphasises the nuclear danger. Thirdly come ìthose unsure how to
thinkî ñ they dislike Iranís attempt to undermine Israelís legitimacy,
yet concede that other issues on the national agenda are more pressing.
 
Public opinion represents a fourth category. What really ìoffendsî them,
said Chazan, is demonising rhetoric and Holocaust denial. Details about
specific security threats do not really interest them. And finally there
are the ìhalf-optionî people, so called because they still remain so few
in number. Chazan dubbed them the ìmuch ado about nothing crowdî.
Generally these are leftwing dissidents who say that ìcrying wolfî about
othersí nuclear weaponry (viz. Iran) will inevitably lead the world to
query Israelís own nuclear capabilityÖ
 
Before predicting what might happen, cautioned Chazan, we should
consider other factors. For instance, most Israelis know precious little
about Iran, and this ìignorance fuels a sense of fearî. Additionally,
those who reject talking to Palestinians tend to over-emphasize the
Iranian threat. Plus views on Iran differ according to which US group
Israelis affiliate with: moderate Democrats or neo-con inspired Republicans.
 
Domestic political considerations play a role, too, just as in Iran.
Whenever a government is in trouble ñ as Olmertís clearly is ñ
politicians tend to do two things simultaneously, noted Chazan, who
heads the School of Government at the Academic College of
Tel-Aviv-Yaffo. They raise security to the top of the agenda, and also
talk about peace. This is exactly what Olmert has done. Coupled with the
mysterious action in eastern Syria, the result has been an overnight
leap in his approval rating from 6% to 18%.
 
Like David, Chazan felt an Osirak 1981-type first strike by Israel was
unlikely. The prevailing view regarding Iran was ìlet America or others
carry the loadî. Psychologically, many feel of Iran: ìIgnore them ñ why
give them the satisfaction of worrying us?î Others think that Iran is
too complicated; rather let their reformists battle militants and donít
interfere.
 
Finally, many feel ñ including Prof Chazan herself ñ that Israel should
stress peace-making closer to home. ìEmbrace the Arab League initiative,
utilise the opening that exists on the Palestinian front, and separate
Syria from its dependence on Iranî. Pursuing this argument, Chazan
envisaged a daring reconfiguration of the old Israeli ìstrategy of the
peripheryî. In the past that meant seeking friends amongst distant
ìouter ringî non-Arab players, so as to counter hostile Arabs. Israelís
key ally then was Persian Iran. Now, mused Chazan, we should think of a
ìreverse strategyî ñ an alliance with moderate Sunni neighbour states,
thus creating a friendly buffer against radical outsiders like Iran in
the north and possibly Sudan to the south.
 
If Prof Chazan called Iranís system complicated, Tehran-born* Prof
Anoush Ehteshami* more than bore out that perception in his talk! Yet,
like his co-speakers, he did so with admirable clarity.
 
A prolific author and acknowledged expert on the minutiae of Iranian
politics, Ehteshami concentrated on four areas: regional politics, the
ìAhmadinejad factorî, the legacy of the revolution, and, finally,
whether conflict was inevitable.
 
Iranís 1979 revolution, he reminded listeners, was a pivotal event whose
centrality should never be underestimated. It brought religion to power
for the first time in the modern age, it marked a challenge for all
Muslims, and its ideology coloured all that followed, including
Ahmadinejadís jaundiced ìthem and usî approach. Historically, the ìnew
Iranî wanted to distance itself completely from the Shahís time; so if
Israel was then Iranís chief ally, now it was the Little Satan.
 
Probably most potently, the revolution symbolised independence for
Iranians; it gave them ìa sense of being in control of their destinyî.
Possessing nuclear power thus expressed a desire for national
assertiveness, a sign that ìwe have arrivedî.
 
As for Iranís power structure, joked Ehteshami, ìit is so complicated,
even Machiavelli would have been pleasedî. Mostly the world sees
Ahmadinejad as dominant; but as president, albeit elected, he is just
one player amongst many. He leads the revolution, but not the state.
Many institutions act as checks and balances. There is the parliament,
the 12 guardians (all clerics) and the Supreme Guide, currently Ali
Khamenei, plus sundry other councils, committees and factions, each with
powerful patrons. Added to the mix are interest groups, including those
who, like Ahmadinejad, believe in the imminent revelation of a ìhidden
imamî.
 
Yet even this labyrinthine set-up, admitted Ehteshami, could not solve
all problems. Iran is one of the leading producers of oil, and the price
has rocketed to $75 a barrel; yet the country still has to import
petrol. Firms aspire to free trade, but are enmeshed in the state
apparatus. Furthermore, Iranís young population ñ 70% are below 30 years
old ñ faces dire unemployment. Billions of dollars worth of know-how
leaves the country each year in the shape of Iranís ìfourth exportî:
people. Even amongst the ayatollahs, many fiercely dislike the whole
experiment of ìpoliticising religionî.
 
In regional terms, Iranís success owes much to othersí weakness, said
Ehteshami. Iran has benefited from Arab troubles arising out of Egyptís
peace treaty with Israel, the ruinous Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, Iraqís
foolish invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the spotlight cast on Saudi Arabia
due to 9/11, and finally the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Bush actually
did Iran a favour, said Ehteshami, by removing two of Tehranís greatest
rivals: Saddam in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. With Iraqís
collapse, Iran has a longer reach and the supposed barrier between Iran
and Israel is no more.
 
Turning to Ahmadinejad, Ehteshami called him ìBushís mirror, a neo-con
par excellenceî. Like his US nemesis, he feels you are either with him
or against him. Agreeing with Peter David, Ehteshami suggested that
Holocaust denial was his own obsession, more so than his peopleís. A
successful combiner of ìreligion, populism and nationalismî, he is a
rabble-rouser who also shuts up people who want dialogue at home.
Likewise his failure to eradicate poverty, as promised, might yet
provoke a large political backlash. In short, Ahmadinejad may not be as
all-powerful as his detractors make him out to be.
 
Lastly, is conflict ìinevitableî? Iran certainly evinces negative
characteristics in US eyes: it supports ìterrorî, wants to possess WMD,
abuses human rights and opposes Israeli Palestinian peace. Washington
also fears the prospect of nuclear proliferation across the region. But
whether this constitutes a definite clash to come is less certain.
 
*****
 
At *question time* an Iraqi foreign ministry official queried whether
Iran really was happy with Saddamís fall, and noted that, in his view,
Iran did not truly back the Shia in Iraq. In response, Peter David said
Iran was glad at Saddamís demise, though it possibly feared the
precedent might lead to their toppling, too.
 
Another questioner wondered whether Israel may talk to Hamas ñ possibly
within the context of Chazanís ìnew openingsî? David admitted that
privately Israeli decision-makers conceded this possibility; but
publicly, it was not mooted. Prof Chazan rejoined that Israel would talk
to Hamas, ìbut not tomorrowî. However, if the forthcoming peace summit
dealt only in the vague generalities, then pressure to talk directly to
Hamas would increase. Chazan also noted that Israel ignored the first
draft of the Arab League proposal in 2002, a plan that ìfrom a purely
Israeli perspective [implies] Israelís dream since 1948î. Now, five
years later, it is embracing it so enthusiastically that it may risk
ìstrangling itî!
 
Someone else suggested that Iran was using Palestinians as a ìdecoyî.
Ehteshami countered that Palestine was no ìmarginal issueî, adding that
the Arab League plan was significant, especially as Saudis were not
known for ìsticking their necks outî.
 
Responding to a view that the panel was ìoverly optimisticî, Peter David
said he thought ìwe were all sounding quite gloomyî. That said, he
reiterated that ìcold realitiesî would dictate caution, and may prevent
a doomsday scenario. He particularly scorned ideas that Iran might
strike Washington itself.
 
ìPessimistsî, noted Chazan, ìare optimists who feel they canít change
the outcomeî. But if problems were clearly identified, you could effect
change. Regarding specifics, she worried about two former Israeli prime
ministers, Netanyahu and Barak, competing as to who could sound tougher
on IranÖ
 
So did Iran see Israel as a threat, asked another questioner? Peter
David thought not. A greater problem, in the view of many Iranians, even
if not expressed openly, was that Iran was defying the UN and IAEA.
Hence the desire to escape isolation was having the opposite effect.
Ehteshami added that one good by-product of the crisis was that nations
were queuing up to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Pact.
 
Several audience members felt that Ahmadinejad had been quoted out of
context, or even mistranslated. Ehteshami disagreed: reading his own
translations of the presidentís words, he showed that Ahmadinejad was,
or at least sounded, unequivocal. ìDonít defend him on any account; what
he says decreases grounds for optimismî, said Ehteshami in a view fully
supported by Peter David.
 
One Kurdish questioner reminded the audience of his peopleís plight at
the hands of Iran, their past friendship with Israel, and the relative
safety of Kurdish northern Iraq. In response to other questions, panel
members discussed Iranís threat to Gulf Arab states, as well last yearís
Israeli-Hizbollah war, which ìregionalised the conflictî and proved that
ìyou cannot manage security by remote controlî.
 
These were just a few instances of a lively, intense yet informative
meeting, one that succeeded, probably beyond expectations, in teasing
out complexities. As to solutions, the jury was out, as the chair may
have said. At least the audience learnt that perceptions, as much as
ìoperative realitiesî, will probably determine what will happen in the
nervous months to comeÖ