Jewish Forum for Justice and Human Rights

Stephanie Koury: Research Fellow at SOAS on law, human rights and peace-building in the Middle East. Formerly advisor to the Palestinian negotiation team. Resided in West Bank and Gaza Strip for eight of the last ten years.

What I want to do in the brief time that I have is to make two key points: One I want to share with you, from a Palestinian perspective, the impact of the violation of human rights on the political process and highlight why it is critical that all human rights violations be addressed simultaneously.

At the political level, the approach by the international community is to de-link Israeli human rights violations or respect thereof, from the political process, particularly a peace process. Rather, the approach is to condition Israeli respect for Palestinian human rights on Palestinian security reform and Palestinian ceasing suicide bombings or violence. This has been the approach since negotiations over the implementation of the Mitchell Committee Report on ending violence and resuming negotiations in April 2001, to PM Sharonís seven days of quiet in 2002, and now with the Quartet Roadmap. The approach is to make Israeli fulfillment of its obligations conditional on Palestinian performance first, even though Israelís obligations are also human rights obligations, be it ceasing its attacks on civilians, freezing settlements, ending its policy of home demolitions and land confiscations; removing roadblocks erected for settlements; stopping its use of excessive force against the Palestinian population.

That one-sided approach does not work because it discounts the dynamics on the ground that are created by Israeli human rights violations ñ dynamics that produce a tit-for tat violence and a discredited negotiation process. Let me explain how:

Working as a technical person on the Palestinian negotiation team, I observed over several years the arguments that Hamas would make and also splinter Fatah groups ñ As Israelís repressive measures became greater and as more Palestinians would suffer from the human rights violations, the arguments became the followingñ ìIsrael is killing our people, shelling our homes, so we are going to strike backî. ñ the incentive became tit-for-tat, violence for violence. Trying to ask who started it first and address it unilaterally did not, nor does it, work. It becomes a chicken and egg problem and if one is serious about addressing the problem, all aspects of violence by all sides need to be ended, it does not matter who started it first. If all aspects are not addressed, calls for negotiations, non-violence lose their legitimacy.

Another example: When Mahmoud Abbas was prime minister for 2 months in June 2003ñ four days after the summit in Aqaba, Israel attempted to assassinate Rantisi and killed four people in the process. The assassination was condemned by the US and Mahmoud Abbas ultimately secured a cease-fire; however, he himself was consistently undercut and weakened by the unwillingness of the Israeli to cease assassinations, remove checkpoints, and end on-going settlement example. He, who was advocating negotiations and non-violence, could not deliver benefits for his people. He subsequently resigned.

Similiarly, what is it that secures the release of Palestinain prisoners? Currently there are approximately 9000 Palestinians being held by Israel and most not given proper due process. Unfortunately, again, it has not been through negotiations by itself because of prior past experience with Israelís approach to prisoner releases. During the Oslo process, Israel released some political prisoners initially but subsequently was releasing petty criminals rather than political ones; moreover, they would not release the long-serving Palestinian prisoners as per the obligations. Subsequent negotiation efforts after 2000 to secure prisoner release did not work either. What has worked? It is Hizballah seizing Israeli soldiers in exchange for the release of Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners. That is the message that is sent ñ you Palestinians will get their prisoners released only if Israeli soldiers are kidnapped. Again, the wrong incentives and dynamics get created.

Take for example another less-known but interesting fact ñ the rate of Israeli settlement expansion ñDuring the Oslo peace process (1993-2000), a period of relatively little violence, Israel increased its settler population by more than 72% and housing units by 52%. According to Israeli reports, the decrease in the rates of expansion of settlements from the 7-9% in the 1990sí to 4-5% during the last few years was due, in large part, to violence. The message then is that violence – not negotiations- helps to end settlements or dramatically reduce their rate of expansion. Again, the wrong dynamics and incentives are created on the ground.

Finally and most recently, the seizure on Gaza. Israel removed it settlements unilaterally from Gaza, without negotiations, in 2005. Some attribute that decision, in part, to the attack on Israeli soldiers combined with Israelís interest in not retaining the Gaza strip. . In November 2005 Israel and the Palestinian Authority negotiated and signed the Agreement on Movement and Access. Israelís failure to largely implement the agreement such as its obligations to facilitate Palestinian agricultural exports; allow truck and bus travel between West Bank and Gaza; etc again raised questions as to the legitimacy of negotiations. Israel would justify this ban on the movement of goods and people on the grounds of security. Once again, groups or individuals that resorted to force had a hand in compelling Israel to remove its settlers from Gaza while, on the other hand, negotiated agreements ñ in this case the movement of goods and people – do not deliver. What again is the message about negotiations versus use of force or violence.

Ways forward:

First, Israel must be held to account for its use of the word ìsecurity and use of securityî rather than allowing Israel to claim security concerns to justify violation of Palestinian human rights. Israel must be held to the international standards provided under international humanitarian and human rights law.
- How is security impacted by preventing Gazan students from studying in the West Bank or preventing goods from leaving Gaza to the West bank or to exports abroad.
- How is security impacted by imposing blanket restrictions on movement of Palestinians in the West Bank who are a particular gender or over a certain age or imposing restrictions for example on all Palestinian movement in the Jordan valley in particular.
- These approaches to Israeli ìsecurityî are not lawful nor legitimate. They constitute forms of collective punishment and some are aimed at facilitating further Israeli settlement expansion.

We are into the sixth year of the Palestinian intifada: The economic desperation is increasing ñ 72% of Palestinians households are predicted to be in poverty by 2007 next and in large part caused by Israelís closure policy and its failure to turn over tax revenues, according to World Bank reports. More apathy and a lack of hope is settling among the population combined with social and political fragmentation.

The international community must pressure Israel to end its human rights violations in the same way it pressures the Palestinians to end their violations. Otherwise, peace will not be possible.